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Trade in Intermediate Producer Services 




In this paper a stylized CGE model is constructed to study the impact of liberalization of 
barriers for foreign providers of intermediate producer services under imperfect 
competition on the welfare, the downstream industry output, the prices of the factors of 
production and the pattern of trade. An attempt is made at incorporating oligopoly 
market structure into the services sector within general equilibrium model. Consequently, 
a model with firms making output conjectures about domestic and foreign rivals is 
adopted. The case of a small developing country with less efficient services sector relative 
to the foreign firms is assumed. In this framework, interaction and the relative significance 
of mechanisms resulting from the love of variety, anti and pro competitive and the 
efficiency effects on the outcomes of the services liberalization is analyzed. It is found that 
the liberalization services trade might be negative in terms of welfare and downstream 
industry expansion even if the profits of the foreign firms are not shifted abroad. This 
represents the evidence of dominant anticompetitive effect. It is therefore important to 
take into consideration the underlying market structure while liberalizing services trade. 
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1.  Introduction 
There  are  many  studies  that  emphasize  the  potential  global  gains  from  services  trade 
liberalization.  Those  gains  are  expected  to  be  higher  than  the  gains  from  goods  trade 
(Hoekman, 2006). In particular, services trade is  expected  to bring significant benefits to 
developing countries where barriers are the highest. The outcomes could be the improvements 
in the household welfare (Rutherford et al, 2006), the long run growth performance (Mattoo et 
al, 2006) and the domestic industry productivity (Markusen et al, 2005). On the other hand, 
numerous quantitative models show that the effects are uneven and some countries may lose 
due to various reasons: rents accruing to the foreign investors, terms of trade deterioration, 
etc. 
It is also observed that the gains of FDI flows which are effectively the liberalization in terms 
of  GATS  (General  Agreement  on  Trade  in  Services)  Mode  3  commercial  presence  and 
ownership restrictions are large and more variable compared to the gains coming from the 
cross border trade. The types of services under consideration are typically producer services 
such as business, transportation, telecommunications, etc that are used as an intermediate 
inputs and barriers are presented in the form of advalorem tariff restrictions.   
   
Markusen  et  al.  (2005)  use  a  model  with  monopolistic  competition  to  show  that  foreign 
producer  services  could  provide  substantial  benefits  to  domestic  firms.  In  particular,  the 
domestic  downstream industry  purchases  higher  quality  business  services  and  expands as 
more foreign firms enter the domestic market.  The optimal tariff is found to be a subsidy.  
However,  particularly  in  developing  countries  many  backbone  services  such  as 
telecommunications, finance and insurance are characterized by oligopoly markets. Hoekman 
(2006), Mattoo and Sauve (2003) and others stress the importance of market structure and 
regulation for the outcomes of services trade liberalization. Furthermore, even though there 
are many trade models that incorporate market power, there are few that address special issues 
related to services (Copeland, 2002).   
 
 In addition to the lack of strategic interaction, the Dixit-Stiglitz type models of monopolistic 
competition are also criticized for failing to capture an empirical observation that trade may 
reduce rather than increase variety. In the model constructed in this paper, albeit there is a 
love-of-variety effect, the number of varieties could in fact fall when relatively more effective 
foreign firms increase their share in the domestic market as a result of trade liberalization.  
This is because foreign firms are subject to higher fixed costs compared to the domestic firms   3 
and  will  consequently  tend  to  form  more  concentrated  market  structure.  In  addition  to 
discriminatory  national  treatment  limitations  like  specific  licensing,  foreign  firms  could 
naturally be expected to have higher fixed costs than domestic firms due to adaptation costs to 
operate in the new business environment, language barriers, etc. It is also plausible to assume 
that foreign firms are more efficient compared to the local firms in the developing countries.   
 
 In such a scenario, if the anticompetitive effect dominates the positive efficiency effect, the 
price  of  the  producer  services  may  not  go  down  and  the  production  in  the  downstream 
industry may not expand. The impact on the welfare would depend on those effects as well 
and could among other things be negative even when all the profits of the foreign firms accrue 
to  the  domestic  representative  agent.  It  will  therefore  be  useful  to  examine  the  optimal 
taxation of the foreign service providers. The rather trivial result describing positive welfare 
effect of trade and investment liberalization obtained from monopolistic competition models 
of trade may not hold in this case. On the other hand, services trade liberalization is expected 
to  bring  higher  gains  in  the  oligopoly  models  compared  to  the  monopolistic  competition 
models due to the pro-competitive effect.  
 
The purpose of this paper is therefore to investigate the relative importance and interactions 
between  the  above  mentioned  causal  mechanisms  in  the  framework  of  the  stylized 
quantitative model. I build upon the approach in Markusen et al. (2005) and construct an 
oligopoly  model  with  conjectural  output  variations  in  producer  services.    The  model  is 
succinct and specifically designed to address the given problem. 
 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents a detailed formulation of the model. The 
impacts of some of the parameters of the model on the markup are presented in section 3. The 
section 4 describes the considerations of the data and the calibration strategy used to obtain 
benchmark replication of the model. The section 5  represents  CGE (Computable General 
Equilibrium) model specifications and the numerical results of the policy experiments and 
section 6 concludes. The derivation of the markup equation is given in the appendix. 
 
2.  Modeling framework 
 
I assume that there are two sectors in the economy: Y denotes sector with market power and Z 
perfectly competitive sector, which represents all the other sectors of the economy.       4 
      
 
Here PS denotes producer services and VA value added. Analogous to Konan and Assche 
(2007)  the  producer  services  are  modeled  so  that  they  affect  positively  the  value  added 
productivity when used as an intermediate good. γ is a corresponding elasticity of substitution. 
The  producer  services  in  turn  constitute  an  Armington  type  CES  (constant  elasticity  of 
substitution) function of domestic and foreign services. While there are no barriers to trade in 
goods, trade in services is subject to tariffs and could only be provided through commercial 
presence. 
    
 
  The domestic XD and foreign XF services are CES aggregates of several varieties. Each firm 
produces only one good (variety) and competes in quantities with both domestic and foreign 
firms.  
    
 




Here nd , nf   are the number of domestic and foreign firms correspondingly. The production of 
each variety is subject to scale economies due to the fixed costs and uses domestic primary 
factors of production: S denotes skilled labor and L denotes all the other factors of production. 
The factors of production are supplied inelastically. The production structure of Y sector is 
presented in Appendix A.   
Consumers demand only final products     
1 * (5) U Z Y
α α − =  
   The markup charged by producer services firms will depend on the substitution elasticities 
at different stages of production and the output conjectures of the rival firms. In Appendix B, 
the perceived price elasticity of demand is derived under the assumption that the domestic 
firms  make  the  same  conjectures  about  the  behavior  of  the  foreign  firms  and  there  is 
symmetry in-between the domestic firms as follows:  
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=   is the conjectural elasticity of firm output,  /
d
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Ω = −   is  the  price 
elasticity of demand in the downstream industry.  






The markup equation for the foreign firms is calculated by analogy. The Cournot competition 
will be a particular case of this setting with  0
d
i v =  and 0
f
i v = . Another specification would 
be a cartel with 
d
i d v n =  and
f
i f v n = . 
Since there is no unambiguous analytical solution for the model, it is solved quantitatively.  
 
3.  Partial derivatives of the markup 
 
Evaluating partial derivatives of the markup equation with respect to parameters could already 
give us some insights about the economic reasoning engraved into the model behavior.  In 
particular,  the  partial  derivatives  with  respect  to  the  price  elasticity  of  demand  in  the 
downstream industry Ω and the elasticity of substitution between producer services and value 












The higher price elasticity of demand in the downstream industry will translate into a higher 
responsiveness of the latter to the changes in the input prices and consequently less market 




                                                
i Even if  0 i v =  the left hand side should be negative in most of the cases so that inequality holds. 
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The market power of the producer services will decline as the downstream industry gets more 
flexible in substituting between its primary factors and services inputs. 
The sign of the partial derivative with respect to the Armington type elasticity will depend on 
the value of conjectural elasticity of firm output 
 
 
In this case, under relatively more collusive conjectures of producer services firms about their 
rivals’ output  1
d
i v >   higher elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign services 
sectors will lead to a higher markup of the domestic firms. On the other hand, if service 
producers  are  relatively  more  competitive  in  quantities 1
d
i v < ,  higher  Armington  type 
elasticity will lead to a lower markup.  
 
The similar pattern could be observed for the partial derivative with respect to the elasticity of 
substitution between different varieties 
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Namely that the markup of the domestic firms increases with the domestic share and more 
collusive  conjectures  about  the  behavior  of  the  other  firms  and  drops  in  the  number  of 
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4.  The data in the benchmark and model calibration 
 
The  data  was  structured  so  that  parameters  fall  into  the  reasonable  ranges  based  on  the 
empirical estimates and also reflect the assumptions made with respect to the structure of the 
model. In particular, I assume that the sector which uses intermediate producer services is 
more  skilled  labor  intensive  than  the  perfectly  competitive  sector  and  that  the  foreign 
producer  services  are  less  skilled  labor  intensive  compared  to  the  domestic  services.  In 
addition I assume that foreign firms are more efficient relative to the domestic firms. There 
are  few  if  no  empirical  studies  of  comparative  efficiency  between  domestic  and  foreign 
service providers in the developing countries (Whalley, 2004). The final goods are traded so 
that the good from the sector with imperfect competition is imported and the good from the 
perfectly  competitive  sector  is  exported  in  the  benchmark  scenario.  Since  there  is  no 
consistent information on the cost structure, the fixed cost ratio is obtained residually from the 
markup estimates.  
  
There  are  several  ways  in  which  a  CGE  model  with  imperfect  competition  could  be 
calibrated. I extraneously set the number of firms and the benchmark level of the markups and 
calibrate the bottom level elasticity of substitution  , d f σ σ  residually (Gasiorek et. al (1992), 
Haaland and Norman (1992), Willenbockel (1994, 2004)). The average price to marginal cost 
ratios is estimated to be 1.56 for the Euro area and 1.38 for the US. It is predicted to be even 
higher under increasing returns to scale (Christopoulou Vermeulen, 2008). I use the value of 
1.6 for the price to marginal cost ratio which is then easily transformed into the markup value. 
The model is calibrated so that many variables are equal to one in the benchmark. There are 
no relevant estimates for the substitution elasticities used in the model. However, it is rational 
to expect that elasticities of substitution between services are less than the ones between the 
goods. The number of firms is taken arbitrarily to be 10 for both domestic and foreign sectors. 
I  also  observe  the  values  of  calibrated  elasticities  to  be  insignificantly  responsive  to  the 
changes in the number of firms. The model uses GAMS/MPSGE syntax to obtain numerical 
solutions of the given CGE model. 
 
5.   The CGE model and the results of the numerical experiments  
 
In the base scenario, I assume Cournot competition and increasing substitution elasticities 
from the top level to the bottom in the production structure of the model: d σ σ γ ≥ ≥ . The   8 
adopted modeling approach assumes economies of scale at the firm level based on the fixed 
costs.  The  domestic  and  foreign  firms  are  modeled  as  representative  agents  that  receive 
markup revenues and pay fixed costs. In other words, a zero profit condition at, for example, 
the domestic variety level will look as follows: 
1
1 * *(1 ) (12)
d
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σ − = ∀ . Hence, the price at 
the  industry  level  is  increasing  in  the  elasticity  of  substitution  between  varieties  and 
decreasing in the number of firms. The total cost for the domestic industry, under zero profit 
condition, could then be written as: 
1
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I assume fixed costs in quantities at the variety level (FC) and the second term on the left 
hand side of (13) represents the total markup revenue of the firms in the domestic industry. 
The  latter  is  also  the  fixed  cost  in  values  at  the  industry  level: 
* * * *
d d FC d PD XD markup FC P n = . It will not be quite fixed as it changes in terms of the 
price of the fixed cost (
d FC P ) and the number of firms.    










The  left hand  side represents a demand for  the  domestic industry  good  by the  Shepard’s 
lemma and the right hand side is the quantity supplied. At the variety level the condition is: 
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In this way, analogous to Markusen (2002), Markusen et al. (2005), the symmetry between 
varieties enables one to express the whole system at the industry level only. 
A higher elasticity of substitution between varieties ( d σ ) would, ceteris paribus, mean higher 
cost for the firm. This is explained by the love of variety effect: consumers value more variety 
and higher substitution will decrease the love of variety effect which in turns implies a higher 
cost if the same number of varieties is kept.   
                                                
i  The economies of scope could also be incorporated into the setting by adding a fixed cost at an industry level    9 
The number of firms is determined endogenously. In the base scenario, I assume that the share 
of the domestic industry is equal to the share of the foreign industry. The foreign firms are 
subject to two types of the discriminatory barriers: per unit of output tax and lump sum tax. 
The counterfactual experiments represent the free trade case when both taxes are lifted and 
the  cases  without  only  output  or  lump  sum  taxes.  Table.1  reports  the  results  of  the 
counterfactual policy experiments in percentages.   Table 2 in the Appendix B reports values 
in levels.   
Table 1: Results of services trade liberalization in percentages 
  Percentage change from the benchmark 
Variables  No output tax  No lump 
sum tax 
Free trade 
Welfare  -1%  -1%  -2% 
Perfectly competitive sector (Z)  8%  9%  14% 
Downstream industry (Y)  -43%  -48%  -68% 
Producer services (PS)  -43%  -48%  -69% 
Domestic services (XD)  -52%  -58%  -80% 
Foreign services (XF)  -14%  -17%  -28% 
Payments to the other factors of 
production  2%  2%  3% 
Payments to skilled labor  -4%  -5%  -7% 
Net exports of Z  100%  112%  163% 
Net imports of Y  109%  123%  174% 
Markup of domestic service providers  7%  9%  18% 
Markup of foreign service providers  6%  7%  15% 
Price index for welfare  0%  0%  0% 
Price of the Z good  0%  0%  0% 
Price of the downstream industry (PY)   0%  0%  0% 
Price of services sector composite (PPS)   2%  2%  3% 
Price of the domestic services (PXD)  23%  28%  61% 
Price of the foreign services (PXF)  -13%  -15%  -24% 
Number of domestic firms  -35%  -40%  -61% 
Number of foreign firms  -18%  -21%  -35% 
Share of the domestic sector  -15%  -17%  -31% 
Share of the foreign sector  15%  17%  31% 
Output per domestic firm  -26%  -30%  -50% 
Output per foreign firm  5%  6%  9% 
 
The  welfare,  measured  as  Hicksian  welfare  index,  will  fall  as  a  result  of  services  trade 
liberalization.  In  particular,  free  trade  brings  2%  decrease  in  the  welfare.  It  is  also 
accompanied  by  the  higher  prices  of  both  goods  and  the  contraction  of  the  downstream 
industry. The latter, in turn, stems from the equivalent contraction in the producer services 
and the higher price of the services composite. The anticompetitive effect dominates in both 
domestic and foreign services sectors. In this setting, an increase of either output or lump sum 
tax within a reasonable range would be welfare improving.   10 
 
In the domestic sector the market share falls and the number of firms and the output per firm 
decline. The market concentration is stronger and it is evident from the increased price and 
the markup over the marginal cost than in the benchmark. 
 In the foreign services sector, after taxes are lifted, more efficient foreign firms get a higher 
share in the industry and they are able to charge a lower price than the local firms and the 
output per firm increases. This implies a pro-competitive effect. Alternatively, the overall 
market  concentration  is  also  pressed  to  increase  since  foreign  firms  are  subject  to  the 
relatively higher fixed costs. The anticompetitive effect seems to dominate; indeed, this is 
evident from the increase in the markup charged by the foreign firms and the rise in the 
number of foreign firms. Moreover, the rise in the output per firm in the foreign industry is 
much smaller than the fall in the domestic industry. Similarly, the price charged by the foreign 
services  providers  is,  on  one  hand,  influenced  to  move  upwards  by  the  higher  market 
concentration and on the other hand it is expected to fall after taxes are lifted. As a result of 
those counteracting effects, prices charged by the foreign firms fall but by a smaller amount 
relative to the price upsurge by in the domestic industry. 
 
The perfectly competitive sector (Z) expands and the payments to the factors used intensively 
in the production of the good produced by this sector increase. The payments to the skilled 
labor  which is used  relatively more intensively by  downstream  industry and by producer 
services  fall  after  taxes  on  the  foreign  providers  are  lifted.  This  result  is  robust  to  the 
previously made assumption that local firms are more skilled labor intensive than the foreign 
firms. In the case where foreign firms are more skilled labor intensive than the local firms the 
price of the domestic services increase more and foreign services price decrease more than in 
the initial case. It does not bring much improvement against the negative anticompetitive 
effect  with  all  the  other  changes  being  approximately  the  same  Appendix  C  (Table  3, 
scenario1). 
 
The  external sector is  not comprehensively  modeled and the direction of trade change  is 
consistent with the change in the production by the corresponding sector. Even if the country 
is a net exporter of the skilled labor intensive goods of the downstream industry, the results 
remain similar Appendix C (Table 3, scenario2). Another potentially important variable is the 
share  of  the  domestic  firms  in  the  total  industry.  In  Appendix  C  (Table  4,  scenario3),  I 
increase the share of the domestic sector. Thus, the share of the foreign firms is smaller in the   11 
benchmark and the calibrated value of the elasticity of substitution between domestic varieties 
increases.  In  this  case  domestic  firms  have  higher  economies  of  diversification  than  the 
foreign firms; nonetheless, welfare improvements are insignificant. 
 
 It is also important to look at the sensitivity of the obtained results to the change in the fixed 
costs.  In  Appendix  C  (Table  4,  scenario4)  I  present  the  results  of  the  smaller  market 
concentration in the foreign services sector as reflected by the lower level of the fixed costs 
relative to the domestic industry. The negative welfare effect coming from the contraction of 
the downstream industry reverses. The downstream industry expands significantly and both 
domestic and foreign industries expand. The trade in goods reverses and the home country 
starts exporting skill intensive good. As a result of that a payment to the skilled labor increase 
and the payment to the other factors of production falls. This effect is partially explained by 
the pro competitive effect. It is more plausible to assume that foreign firms are more efficient 
than domestic firms in terms of comparably lower variable rather than fixed costs. However, 
this  experiment  effectively  stresses  the  importance  of  the  anticompetitive  effect  as  an 
explanation of the negative contraction in the downstream industry and welfare.   
 
6.  Concluding remarks 
 
The framework constructed in this paper demonstrates interesting relationships between the 
key variables in the model of trade liberalization under imperfect competition. It appears that 
anticompetitive effect may dominate the system in such a way that more protectionism rather 
than openness is welfare improving. However, this result should be accepted with due caution 
because of the stylized nature of the underlying model. In other words, it is rather narrowly 
focused  and  emphasizes  particular  mechanisms  only.  On  the  other  hand,  a  stylized 
quantitative model could serve as a useful tool to disentangle various effects present in the 
more complicated applied models. Those latter models are frequently viewed as black boxes 
because it could be difficult to explain which mechanisms and effects are responsible for the 
results (Devarajan, Robinson, 2005). Both applied and stylized models could be combined to 
be used effectively in the policy analysis. 
 
The  improvements  in  the  data  on  services  could  significantly  enhance  the  power  of  the 
analysis. In the model setting presented in the paper, individual firm efficiency and fixed cost 
share depend positively on each other. The differences in the cost share between foreign and   12 
domestic firms appear to be critical for the anticompetitive effect obtained from the policy 
experiments  in  the  numerical  model.  On  the  other  hand,  there  is  a  lack  of  data  on  the 
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Appendix B:  Derivation of the markup equation 
 
     Since the downstream industry is assumed to be perfectly competitive, we have: 
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In order to rewrite (5A) in terms of the relative changes, I adopt the so called hat notation that is 
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∧ =  is a conjectural elasticity of output. 
I could use the following to further simplify (7A):  
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  share of the domestic sector. 
 
Assuming that the domestic firms make the same conjectures about the behavior of the foreign firms 






= ), the following expressions could be 
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The production of the downstream industry could be written in hat notation: 
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Appendix C: Results of the sensitivity analysis 
 
Table 2: Results of services trade liberalization in levels 
  Change in levels from the benchmark 







Welfare  1.00  0.99  0.99  0.98 
Perfectly competitive sector (Z)  1.00  1.08  1.09  1.14 
Downstream industry (Y)  1.00  0.57  0.52  0.32 
Producer services (PS)  1.00  0.57  0.52  0.32 
Domestic services (XD)  1.00  0.48  0.42  0.20 
Foreign services (XF)  1.00  0.86  0.84  0.72 
Payments to the other factors of production  1.00  1.02  1.02  1.03 
Payments to skilled labor  1.00  0.96  0.95  0.93 
Net exports of Z  1.00  2.00  2.12  2.63 
Net imports of Y  1.00  2.09  2.23  2.74 
Markup of domestic service providers  0.38  0.40  0.41  0.44 
Markup of foreign service providers  0.40  0.42  0.43  0.46 
Price index for welfare  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
Price of the Z good  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
Price of the downstream industry (PY)   1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
Price of services sector composite (PPS)   1.00  1.02  1.02  1.03 
Price of the domestic services (PXD)  1.00  1.23  1.28  1.61 
Price of the foreign services (PXF)  1.00  0.87  0.85  0.76 
Number of domestic firms  10.00  6.47  5.99  3.93 
Number of foreign firms  10.00  8.17  7.89  6.55 
Share of the domestic sector  0.50  0.43  0.41  0.34 
Share of the foreign sector  0.50  0.57  0.59  0.66 
Output per domestic firm  0.10  0.07  0.07  0.05 
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Table 3: Sensitivity analysis  
   
Here scenario 1 one represents the case where foreign firms are more skilled labor 
intensive than the local firms. The column denoted percent shows the percentage deviation 
from the benchmark. The scenario 2 presents the case where good Y is exported and good Z is 





















Welfare  0.980  -2%  0.980  -2% 
Perfectly competitive sector (Z)  1.138  14%  1.134  13% 
Downstream industry (Y)  0.302  -70%  0.305  -70% 
Producer services (PS)  0.297  -70%  0.299  -70% 
Domestic services (XD)  0.181  -82%  0.189  -81% 
Foreign services (XF)  0.694  -31%  0.687  -31% 
Payments to the other factors of 
production  1.034  3%  1.029  3% 
Payments to skilled labor  0.926  -7%  0.926  -7% 
Net exports of Z  2.663  166%  0.657  166% 
Net imports of Y  2.788  179%  0.813  181% 
Markup of domestic service 
providers  0.447  19%  0.445  19% 
Markup of foreign service 
providers  0.461  15%  0.461  15% 
Price index for welfare  1.000  0%  0.998  0% 
Price of the Z good  1.000  0%  0.997  0% 
Price of the downstream industry 
(PY)   1.000  0%  1.003  0% 
Price of services sector composite 
(PPS)   1.036  4%  1.044  4% 
Price of the domestic services 
(PXD)  1.645  65%  1.621  62% 
Price of the foreign services (PXF)  0.756  -24%  0.770  -23% 
Number of domestic firms  3.753  -62%  3.846  -62% 
Number of foreign firms  6.457  -35%  6.410  -36% 
Share of the domestic sector  0.338  -32%  0.344  -31% 
Share of the foreign sector  0.662  32%  0.656  31% 
Output per domestic firm  0.048  -52%  0.049  -51% 
Output per foreign firm  0.107  7%  0.107  7%   18 
Table 4: Sensitivity analysis 
 








Welfare  0.986  -1%  1.078  8% 
Perfectly competitive sector (Z)  1.117  12%  0.114  -89% 
Downstream industry (Y)  0.422  -58%  6.152  515% 
Producer services (PS)  0.416  -58%  6.866  587% 
Domestic services (XD)  0.304  -70%  3.974  297% 
Foreign services (XF)  1.162  16%  7.092  609% 
Payments to the other factors of production  1.028  3%  0.841  -16% 
Payments to skilled labor  0.938  -6%  1.515  52% 
Net exports of Z  2.384  138%  -9.221  -1022% 
Net imports of Y  2.491  149%  -12.472  -1347% 
Markup of domestic service providers  0.433  15%  0.334  -11% 
Markup of foreign service providers  0.427  7%  0.145  -28% 
Price index for welfare  1.000  0%  1.002  0% 
Price of the Z good  1.000  0%  1.003  0% 
Price of the downstream industry (PY)   1.000  0%  0.997  0% 
Price of services sector composite (PPS)   1.030  3%  0.800  -20% 
Price of the domestic services (PXD)  1.379  38%  0.876  -12% 
Price of the foreign services (PXF)  0.647  -35%  0.736  -26% 
Number of domestic firms  5.058  -49%  22.989  130% 
Number of foreign firms  8.362  -16%  29.013  190% 
Share of the domestic sector  0.544  -22%  0.428  -14% 
Share of the foreign sector  0.456  52%  0.572  14% 
Output per domestic firm  0.060  -40%  0.173  73% 
Output per foreign firm  0.139  39%  0.244  144% 
Here scenario 3 presents the case where share of the domestic industry is higher than 
the share of the foreign industry in the benchmark.  The scenario 4 represents the case where 
the fixed costs and correspondingly the markup of the foreign firms are reduced. The free 
trade is a policy experiment in all the cases 
 